Research on organization slack has focused mainly on Its effect in large publicly traded firms, but little work exists on the value of slack resources for other firms. Therefore, here, we address the question: Do slack resources matter in the case of Initial public offerings (IPOs)? We argue that firms that possess financial, innovational, and managerial slack resources are sending a positive signal to potential investors regarding the quality of the IPO. Using a sample of high-tech IPOs, we find support for that contention.
Introduction
In established firms. it has been found that slack resources act as incentives to experiment and make proactive strategic choices (George, 2005) . they are deployed to build capabilities that make firms competitive, tbey help maintain coalitions that ensure the convergence of personal and organizational goals. and they act as buffers in periods of economic duress (George). We argue that excess or "slack" resolln;es possessed by firms undergoing an initial public offering (IPO) can signal the future potential of that firm and the quality of the investment. From a resource-based perspective, slack resources can provide a competitive advantage to new firms and. therefore, offer a promise of superior financial performance. Because new firms have not yet demonstrated the ability to sllccessfully handle the demands of public trading (e.g., market fluctua tions). they are discounted by investors (Certo. 2003) . Slack resources may compen sate for this "Iiability of market newness" by reducing the risk of investment for the purchasers of the IPO. The main reasons why finns undertake IPO, are twofold: needing capital to bring an invention to market. or the owners. or venture capitalists. wanting to be able to realize tinancial gains. In the case of the latter. investors will only bc interested in making a financial commitment if the business has the potential for generating capital gains in stock. which. again, means bringing a viable invention to market Of capitalizing on an existing invention. That requires having operational abilities. the ability to innovate or generate subsequent innovations, and managers to formulate strategy and implement suppoI1ing tactics. Therefore. this research focuses on three types of slack resources that are particularly relevant to firms that are going through an IPO. Like most work on slack, we use financial slack as an independent variable. We also develop two measures of slack that are new: innovation slack-the reason most new firms emerge-and mana gerial slack, which reflects Penrose's (1959) original arguments on spare management capacity and its value in promoting firm growth. By examining all three types, this work provides a more complete understanding of the effects of slack resources on young organizations.
Slack denotes the difference between a firm's current resources and the current resource demands on the linn (Mishina. Pollock. & Porae, 2004) . Slack resources provide firms with the required flexibility to develop strategic options to pursue opportunities (Greenley & Oktemgil, 1998) . They also can be diverted or redeployed to achieve orga nizational goals (George. 2005) . Slack ha~ been used to explain diverse organizational phenomena including performance. innovation. goal conflict. effectiveness, and political behavior, and these resources differ in both type (e.g .. financial or social capital) and form (c.g.. absorbed or unahsorbed). As already noted, studies of organizational slack typically have focused on large publicly traded firms. which arc dealing with very different issues to nascent 11rms. Verv little attention has been given in the literature to the effect of ~ -organizational slack on the performance of these younger firms.
In business, we llsually address risk in terms of managerial risk, or income stream uncertainty tef. Palmer & Wiseman. 1999) . but a third conceptualization of risk. which is implicit in these other definitions. is explained as probability x consequence (Reed. Lemak. & Hesser, 1997) . This latter conceptualization of risk has utility in model building (Storrucl-Barnes. Reeel. & Jessup, 20 I 0). Here. probabi lity and consequence refer to the probability of an investor losing their investment in an IPO flnn. In larger. established f1rms. the implicit question that has always shadowed work on slack is whether or not an agency issue exists as managers try to reduce risk to their employment capital by holding slack as a cushion against a downturn in performance (e.g., Bourgeois, 1981 : Nohria & Gulati. 1995 , 1996 . In established f1rms, managers keep their jobs and stockholders keep most or all of their investment. For new firms. the issue is different. Slack resources reduce the probability that the firm will fail. which means that for a given level of return, investors will be willing to pay a premium at the time of the IPO. In new firms, not only do slack resources increase the upside potential of being able to capitalize on opportunities. they also reduce downside risk for investors.
This work contributes to the literature in several ways. First, we propose that slack resources represent important information for IPO investors; slack resources act as a quality signal. It thus provides insight into the value investors place on slack resources. Second, it provides empirical support for the conceptual framework by drawing on a rich set of IPO data in the United States during the period of [2001] [2002] [2003] [2004] [2005] [2006] [2007] [2008] [2009] . Third, we extend organizational slack research by moving away from well-established organizations to study the effect of slack resources in IPO finns. Finally. this study extends knowledge on organizational slack by moving beyond the traditional emphasis on financial slack to include innovational and managerial slack.
Theoretical Foundations and Literature Review Signaling Theory and IPO Firm Research
Investors not only find it challenging (0 evaluate the overall quality of an IPO in terms of the potential returns that will be generated. there are also difficulties with assessing risk, despite [he list of risks that have to be included in the published pro spectuses, Assessing risk is difficult because these new-[o-the-murket firms may have few or no revenues, and it may be difficult to accurately value their assets, To overcome such hurdles, investors seek nontraditional methods for making assessments of IPO quality, They rely on signals that can indicate the quality of the firm (Cerlo, 2003) , Firms that afC able to signal high quality stand a better chance of raising the necessary capital through an IPO for commercialization of underlying technology and future growth (Deeds, DeCarolis, & Coombs, 1997 : Stuart. Hoang, & Hybels, 1999 . Among other things. signaling mechanisms that are llsed by firms include the reputations of invest ment bankers (Carter. Dark, & Singh. 1998b) . auditor,; (Beatty. 1989) . and VCl1lurc capitalists (Megginson & Weiss. 1991) . The t:1Ct that investment bankers avoid poor quality IPO Ilrms to protect their reputations is evidence of the credibility of this type of signal (Certo. 2003) . According to market-signaling theory. certain variables or indica tors send signab to potential investors about the capabiliti(:s and, therefore, the future value of finns (Akerlof. 1970 : Spellce. 1973 ). Signaling theory is useful in situations where information asymmetry is high (Spence) because, as Akerlof showed. in instances where buyers (for IPOs, read investors) cannot determine quality. they are reluctant to buy. and markets collapse.
The literature on 11'0 signaling is extensive. For example, the board of directors can act as a signal to potential resource holders about the quality of a young firm (Certo. Daily. & Dalton, 200 I) , especially given that investors value prestigious board structures, thus reducing the liability of newness and improving IPO firm stock performance (Ccrto. 2003) . Pollock. Chell. Jackson, and Hambrick (2010) (Zimmerman, 2(08) . Signals to investors also can be achieved through releasing informatioll on research and development (R&D) expendi tures. the history of technological performance. or the number of products brought to the market (Deeds el al.. 1997) . Table I provides a summary of key literature Oil signaling in IPOs. Ndofor and Levitas (2004. p. 688 ) define signaling as "the conduct and observable attributes that alter the beliefs of. or convey information to. other individuals in the market about unohservable attributes and intentions." Where Ndofor and Levitas were concerned with both behavior and attributes. we arc concerned only with the latter. We are concerned with investors' ability to see information on slack resources and interpret it in terms of potential for future income and amelioration of investment risk. Thus. we draw on the essential principle of signaling theory: the signal must be observable (Spence. 1973) and known in advance (Certo. Daily, et al.. 2001: Janney & Folta. 20(H) . Consistent with the logic of Ndofor and Lcvitas. !inns that signal the existence of slack resources are creating a "separating equilibrium" whereby investors are able to distin guish between firms with the potential f,)r growth and reduced risk and those that do uo! have the potential. or which carry higher risk. Given that money for investment in lPOs is not available in infinite alllounts. and that other firms Illay be doing an 11'0 at the saille time. it becomes a zero-sum game whereby olle firm is likely to win at another's expense. Firms that are endowed with slack resources will therefore make a point of signaling it to investors. whereas those that do not possess the slack will be unable to make that signal.
Because resource information is included in the prospectus. slack resources arc known to investors in advance of the actual offering. Pinancial-slack information can be gathered from a firm's balance sheet. Information on other types of slack, such as managerial and innovational slack, also can be found in the prospectus. Managerial information can be found in the management section of the prospectus. Innovational slack information can be found both in the income statement (R&D spending) and in the business section (patent counls).
Organization Slack
Financial Slack Researchers have used financial slack in a number of different forms as a predictor of innovation (Nohria & Gulati. 1996 ), performance (Bromiley. 1991 Tan & Peng, 2003) , and the firm' s ability to experiment (Wiseman & BromiIey, 1996) . Financial slack refers to the level of assets available to an organization (e.g .. cash on hand) (Kraatz & Zajac, 2001 ) tilat can easily be deployed to varied uses (Mishina et aI., 2004) . Financial slack is the least absorbed form of slack, especially given that it is completely divisible for the allocation of multiple activities (Greve, 2003) . (Bourgeois, 1981 : Nohria & Gulati, 1995 , 1996 Tan & Pcng, 2003 ) because Bourgeois's original thinking on the topic linked organizational inefficiency to slack. He argued that inefficiency is a natural outcome of high levels of slack within an organi zation. This may be true in weil-established. publicly traded Ilrms. We argue that IPO finns do not have the luxury of being seell as inefficiellt. given the high scrutiny they face when going public. However. firm valuation may depend 011 whether a firm will have the resources necessary to successfully navigate the IPO process. In this case. slack would ease capital restrictions and improve the strategic choices of managers for investments with positive performance implications (George, 20(5) . Also, it allows flex ibility and experimentation. which can have positive performance effects (George). Bourgeois fllliher suggested that slack gives decision makers the freedom to make deci siclIIs with little information. and that. when necessary, it may give an organization the time needed 10 collect additional information. In view of these arguments. we propose that higher levels of financial slack are positively related to firm valuation at IPO. The higher the level of linancial slack. the stronger and more apparent is the quality signal to investors.
Using precedent (e.g .. Mishina et al.. 2004; Voss, Sirdeshl11ukh, & Voss, 2(08) . ami building on the view that slack resources should be considered as excess resources rather than just total resources (Moses. 1992). we explore the effects of two different types of financial slack (cash reserves and working capital). Cash reserves represent the level of available cash (cash on hand) to an organization (Kraatz & Zajac. 20(1). For investors. slack resources in the form of cash. which is the nearest of financial resources and the most fungible, sends a strong signal. If the tirm has sales, then it signals upside potential in the form of positive cash flow and an ability to generate more cash. In terms of the dowllside. regardless of whether or not the linn has sales. it signals protection against failure and bankruptcy. The more cash a firm has, then the more positive the signal. Working capital is different. It is the difference between current assets and current liabilities. and it captures the use of current resources relative to activity (Bourgeois & Singh, 1983) . II portrays information OJ] the assets required to maintain day-to-day operations. and includes things like inventory needed for operations and excess of accollnts receivable over accounts payable. again. relative to the level of activity (Moses). Working capital is a resource that is neither a near resource (easily turned into cash), particularly in young finns without the leverage to collect bills or with invcntory of a new or unproven technology. nor is it particularly fungible. That means that the greater the amount of working capital required to maintain day-tcH!ay operations, the greater the risk for investors. Firms that can operate with less working capital should be able to attract an investment premium over those that require more working capital.
Details Oil approaches lIsed to measure cash reserves and working capital are described in the Method, section. [n the interim. it can he stated that:
Hypothesis la: There is a positive linear relationship between cash reserves and IPO valuation. Hypothesis Ib: There is a negative linear relationship between working capital and IPO valuation.
Innovational Slack. Our interest lies specifically with the slack useful for generating innovations. which will be called in this paper "innovational slack." Innovational slack refers to the stock of resources available to an organization such as underused R&D facilities. specialized development staff. and time for development activities. Managers call allocate a certain amount of time for product developers to work on their own projects and loosen performance standards for new projects (Jelinek & Schoonhoven. 1990 ). Overall. then. innovational slack can be viewed as a refinement to existing organizational-slack theory. In this work. we view innovational slack as excess ullused intellectual property and above-industry-average R&D spending. We suggest that firms may have two different types of innovational slack: inputs into the innovation process (e.g .. R&D) and outputs (e.g .. patents). Both can be lIsed to create more inno vations through the application of new knowledge or by combining them with other knowledge.
Proponents of slack argue that organizational slack plays a vital role in allowing innovation (Nohria & Gulati. 1995) . Slack permits firms to more safely experiment with new strategies and innovative projects that lllost probably would not be approved in a more resource-constrained environment (Cyert & March, 196311992) . Other researchers counter this argument, suggesting that slack diminishes incentives to innovate ancl pro motes undisciplined investment in R&D activities that rarely yield economic benefits (Leibenstein, 1969) . To reconcile these differences. Nohria ancl Gulati (1995 . 1996 hypothesized and demonstrated that the actual relationship between slack and innovation is curvilinear (an inverse U-shape). Pcr that inverted-U argument on slack. it can be argued that too much slack before the IPO implies that such firms will face diminishing disci pline. As slack increases, the discipline that is exercised in the selection, ongoing support. and termination of projects becomes lax (Jensen, 1993 : Leibenstein: Nohria & Gulati. 1996 . For example. over time, and with increasing slack, risky projects with negative net present value may be funded simply because the resources exist to indulge agents for whom these are pet projects (Nohria & Gulati) . Escalation of commitment also becomes an issue given that excess levels of slack make it difficult to terminatc someone' s pet project (Staw, Sandelands. & Dutton, 1981) . Therefore, it can be argued that innovational slack fosters an X-inefficient (Leibenstein. 19(6) atmosphere around resource allocation that increases both the risk that poor projects will be continued even in the face of negative information and that projects will he abandoned simply because someone ran out of energy. became bored. or ran into a tough problem (Nohria & Gulati. 1996) . Based OIl these arguments we propose that innovational slack would have a positive effect on IPO valuations up to a certain point. but, after that point. slack can indicate future inefficiency ancI will have a negative effect.
The relative amount of R&D spending has heen used as an indicator of innovative activity (Scherer, 1980) , and a number of studies have considered the relationship between R&D spending, productivity returns. and linn performance (Comanor, 1965 : Grabowski & Vernon, 1990 : Graves & Langowitz. 1993 . As the majority of the work in this area notes, there are strong industry norms associated with R&D spending. We therefore hypothesize that. relative to the industry. R&D spending will he associated with gains in [PO value but. after a certain point, investors will interpret the spending as indicative of inefficiency. and the effect will be negative.
Patents also are widely used as indicators of innovation activity and essential tech nology positions (Deeds et aI., 1997, p. 37) , and arc widely accepted measures used by policy makers. analysts (Van del' Eerden & Saelens, 1991) , and researchers (Deeds et al.) .
Patents provide inventors with protection in the form of a finite-life monopoly for their intellectual property. Governments are willing to issue patents to inventors in return for the greater good to society or economic progress. but issuing patents is an effective way to remove barriers to informatioll asymmetry. As Long (2002) indicated. a downside to providing the information in a patent means that competitors may be able to quickly circumvent critical aspects of an invention and effectively appropriate some of the pat entee's rents. The solution to that problem is to patent and protect information for core markets and related technologies by creating impenetrable patent fences, which allow the patent holder to exploit a technology and appropriate relums by blocking existing and new competitors (Reitzig. 2004) . The creation of fences involves what is referred to as patent rafting or bulking, which simply means that a large number of patents are created around the core technology and related technologies. The process can be expensive. Firms not only have to apply for the patents but also have (0 maintain the patents through renewal, up to three limes during the life of the patent in the United States. with increasing fees for eacb renewal (Malewicki & Sivukumar, 2004 J. After the patents have been issued. they then have to be defended against infringement (Long) . As explained by Grady, Alexander, Martin, and Merges (1992) , to make defense worthwhile, the benefits of
protecting the technology have to be significant. In addition to the costs of application and renewal, there are also the costs of time (patent-infringement monitoring). legal costs. and emotional and time costs of defense. As Somaya (2003, p. 24) explained in his research on patent litigation in the computers and research-medicine industries. defense can be expensive, not only in terms of direct legal costs but also because it absorbs "the time of key managers. lawyers. engineers, and scientists in the company." As the number of patents held inereases. so too do defense costs. Like research and development (R&D) spending, we predict that the relationship between patenting and IPO value will be an inverted-U shape with firms preferring mid levels of patent slack. Mallagerial Slack. After IPO. the top management team must learn to deal with reduced flexibility in managerial discretion. increased oversight from the lirm's board of directors and blockholders, greater demands from investors for short-term performance, and less tolerance of negative press and performance volatility (PriceWaterhotlse, 1995) . The TMT must deal with significant cultural changes, as well as change resulting from its employ ees' neVi-found wealth as options are exercised anti stock is sold, which can lead to some employees leaving the company and some others become less willing to make the personal sacrifices that were required to get the firm to the IPO stage (Fischer & Pollock, 2004) . All of this means that executives are managing the upheaval caused by the IPO while trying to manage growth and plan for the future. Penrose (1959) recognized the importance of managerial slack as an essential factor in linn growth. She observed that finns are able to grow and develop only when excess "managerial services" are released to allow managers to plan and direct growth. She also pointed out that newer IlnllS are faced with numerous difficulties and that focusing on growth while managing those difficulties is extremely challenging (Penrose) . The notion of having above-average mana gerial resources and experience at the time of the IPO is our conceptualization of managerial slack. That means not only having a sufficient nnmber of managers but also having managers with industry experience. Managers' experience with firm-level resources produces firm-specific knowledge about the productive opportunities available to the linn (Penrose) . Penrose further observed that this experience-based knowledge is proprietary because it cannot rapidly be transferred to new managers. nor can it be purchased in the market. She also emphasized that managers cannot function well as a team without firm-specific. shared experience in the TMT. which leads to the creation of wcit knOWledge. In short. managerial expertise is a resource that is valuable. rare. and difficultlo imitate.
Along with Penrose (1959) . other researchers have argued that managers playa vital role in choosing a firm' s direction. the markets it will participate in. and the blend of resources it will deploy and nurture (Castanias & Helfat. 199] ; Kor & Mahoney. 2000; Mahoney & Pandian. 1992 ). An important insight frol11 the resource-based view shows that to generate superior returns. a fim] must not only possess unique resources but also effectively and innovatively manage such resources (Mahoney. 1995) . In pm1icular. lhe bundle of managerial experiences can reflect the TMT's skills. knowledge. and compe tencies (Carpenter. Sanders. & Gregersen. 2001; Harris & Helfat. 1997) . To assess mana geJial competence at the upper ranks. an examination of the bundle of experiences in the TMT is essential. especially because professional management experience molds the knowledge. confidence. and imagination of mangers (Penrose: Van de Ven. Hudson. & Schroeder. 1984) .
Clearly. managers as a resource are crucial for survival and success. On the one the hand. with too few managers. the probability of failure increases. On the other hand. too many managers also create problems. Too many managers not only raises costs in terms of managerial salaries. benefits. and perquisites. but it will also likely lead to a prolifera tion of organizational policies. procedures. and red tape as managers justify their existence and salaries. Again. in Leibenstein's (1966. 19(9) terms. firms with too many managers suffer from X-inefficiency. Thus. in terms of managerial slack. we postulate that Gulati's (1995. 1996 ) curvilinear view of slack will hold. We also postulate that it applies to our second measure of slack: managers' industry experience. Experience slack is aimed at capturing the managerial knowledge of the opportunities. threats. competition. and technologies (Kor. 2003) of an industry that also is important for survival and success. Several studies have shown that a significant amount of comlllonality characterizes the perceptions of managers operating within the same industry. In particular. strategic and environmental information drawn from intra-industry sources bear a marked similarity to lOp managers' own knowledge and perceptions of the environment and opportunities within it. Spender (1989) . labeling these common views "shared recipes." suggested that they emerge as a function of managers' similar experiences amassed through industry tenure. Earlier. Hambrick (1982) had noted a comparable homogeneity in views fostered by top managers' reliance on common sources of industry informatioll. Industry-specillc experience helps top managers intensify their knowledge of competitive conditions and specific technologies in the industry. However. as that knowledge increases. it can change from being a valuable resource to being a core rigidity as managers fall prey to the insidious nature of dominant logic (Prahalad & Bettis. 1986 ). Thus. too little industry knowledge can be a bad thing. as can too much.
Traditionally. the TMT has been defined as lop-level executives such as the chief executive officer (CEO). chief operating officer. business unit heads. and vice presidents (Carpenter et aI., 2001; Finkelstein & Hambrick, 1996) (Carpenter & Petersen, 2002; Loughran & Ritter. 2004) . Consistent with prior research in the fleld, holding companies, financial institutions, and real estate investment trusts were excluded from the sample (e.g., Fischer & Pollock, 2004) . The data were collected from the prospectuses found on the Securities and Exchange Commission Electronic Data Gathering and Retrieval system for IPOs. The final sample included 299 firms.
Measures
Dependent Variable, IPO value. which is also known as IPO proceeds raised. represents the capital raised and transferred to the linn and its owners at IPO. It is measured as the total value of the capital raised (the offer price x the number of shares sold in the offering) minus the underwriters' fees as presented on the cover page of the I1rm' s prospectus (Deeds et al.. 1997; Finkle. J998: Gulati & i-Jiggins. 2003 : Zimmerman. 2008 ). The importance of a venture being able to issue an [PO is extremely important because it captures the amouIlt of capital that an IPO flrm can truly lise (Deeds et al.) . Indepelldent Variables. There is considerable variety in industry context in the sample, and it is possible that slack may differ across industries (George. 20(5). For instance. Miller. Lant. Milliken. and Korn (1996) illustrated that slack correlates differently with perfonnance in the furniture versus software industries. And because slack is operation ally defined as excess absolute levels of resources (Nohria & Gulati. 1996) . we chose to calculate slack as the deviation from the mean of each of the six industries in the sample (e.g.. George). [n IPO research. carc is taken to ensure that sample firms are compared with representative sets. Purnanandam and Swaminathan (2004) and Brau. Brown, and Osteryoung (2004) compared their samples of IPO firms with industry "peers." while Arend (2003) did a dyadic comparison of IPOs with other within-industry IPOs, and MacGregor. Slovic. Dreman. and Berry (2000) split their sample around intra-industry IPO means. Given that we include all IPO firms within our selected industries. we have calculated slack as the deviation from the within-industry. IPO-firm mean.
We also need to note that financial ratios that arc widely used in the literature may differ from one industry to another. Ratios that are the norm in one industry could be extraordinarily high or low in another industry, and thus slack measures may not gener alize across industries (Miller & Leihlein. 1996) . Lev ( 1969) argued that average industry financial ratios offer reasonable proxies for target levels. Therefore, we measured all slack resources as the difference of a firm's own measures (e.g .. accounting ratios) and its industry average. We only utilized firms in our sample to create the industry averages given the uniqueness of IPOs. We believe that the closest comparable group with any IPO firm would be similar finns that are in the saIlle industry that also are in the process of going public.
Cash Cash slack =(firm cash reserves) -(average industry cash reserves) As already noted. lI'orking ('{[pital was chosen because it has been identified by scholars as an appropriate and useful operationalization of !1nancial slack. given that it considers the (appropriate) level of working capital to meet current needs (Mishina et a!., 2004; Moses. 1992). Working capital is calculated by taking the difference between a firm'.s current assets (e.g .. cash and ca,h equivalents, accounts receivable, inventory. and marketable securities) and a firm's current liabilities (e.g .. accounts payable and accrued expenses) (Brealey & Myers, 1996) . The amount that is left after subtracting current liabilities from current assets is a measure of short-term financial resource utilization (Bromiley, 1991; March & Shapira, 1987) . We measured it as follows:
Working capital slack = (finn working capital) -(average industry working capital).
These measures are also similar to the conceptualization advanced by Singh (1986) in regard to the two-component concept of slack where he measured absorbed and unah sorbed slack using cash and working capital. There are. of COHrse. several measures or tlnancial slack such as the three-componenL-based concept developed by Bourgeois and Singh (1983) where slack was measured using available slack (which might be equated to, say. cash). potential slack (a finn's equity-to-debt ratio). and recoverable (or absorbed) slack (which was measured using selling, general and administrative expenses divided by flrm sales) (Bromiley, 1991). We chose not to calculate slack with three components (e.g.. Bromiley) given the diff]culty in reliably using ratios slich as equity to debt for firms that are going through an IPO. The debt to equity calculation does not work because. of course. the equity is arriving via the dependent variable. JPO value. Also. most of these young high-tech firms possibly will have little or no equity while having a lot of debt. Additionally. the equity S!llIcture might not really be well-known at the point of IPO.
Both R&D spending (input flows to the innovation process) and patents (stocks of output of research) are indicators of firm innovation. Traditionally. the relative amount of R&D spending has been used as an indicator of innovative activity (Scherer. 1980) . All else being equal. if Ilnns spend more on R&D than the industry average. there is a higher probability of them having slack intellectual property than if they spent less than the induslry average. This variable is based on the R&D-intensity variable that typically has been calculated as the level of investments divided by the firm's sales. assets. or number of employees (e.g., Deeds, DeCarolis. & Coombs. 1998; Eltlic, 1998) . In this study. R&D investments are standardized by total assets because many IPO firms do not have sales because they are still ill the carly years of product developmcnt (Deeds et al.; Kor. 20(6) . We used the last audited year of R&D spending as provided in the prospect liS of the IPO firm.
R&D investment slack = (firm R&D/firm assets) -(average industry R&D/ average industry assets).
The second innovational-slack measure is palelll illlensity slack. Patents arc eonsid ered indicators of vital technology positions and inllovative activity (Ashton & Sen. 1988 ). According to Deeds et al. (1998) . a firm's patent stock is an indication of the size of a linn's stoek of intellectual property. and thus research productivity. Patent intensity slack was measured using the following equation; Patent inten,dty slack", (number of linn patents! firm assets) (average industry patents/average industry assets).
A1allageria/ slack was defined earlier in the sludy as those excess managerial skills and I!xperiences that hdp the firlll to grow and. also as previously noted. in the JPO literalllrc. researchers have considered all inside exeeutives I isted in the prospectus as key manage ment personnel (e.g .. Kor. 2(03) . Therefore, this work also lIses the number of all insiders:
Insider slack", (number of firm TMTjfirm assets) (average industry TMT/avcrage industry assets).
To caplllre a different dimension of managerial slack. we measured experience slack-the industry experience of the TMT. Based on Kor (2003) . we measured this variable as the average number of managerial positions held in the same industry by managers in the firm compared with the average industry TMT positions held. This measure captures the breadth of industry-specifIc experience possessed by the managers (Kor) . and similar to the first measure. it assumes that firms with more managers with industry experience will have more experience slack to draw upon. Also. because the size of TMTs differ from one company to the other, taking the Ilumber of positions held relative to the average number of the TMT will control for the size of 1he flrl11. Thus:
Experience slack '" (average firm TMT positions/lotal number of linn insiders) (average industry TMT positions/average number of indust!'y insiders).
Control Variables
Per the precedent established in other IPO studies, we controlled for firm age (e.g., Beatty, 1989; Beatty & Zajac. 1994; Finkle, J998) . which we measured as years from founding (e.g., Zimmerman, 2008) . It was employed as a control variable in this work because older firms, both prior to and following the IPO, have been found to financially outperform younger firms (Ceno. Covin. Daily, & Dalton. 2001; Ritter. 1998) . Also. firms with longer track records are known to have a greater chance of survival (e.g., Fischer & Pollock, 20(4) . The reputation of the Ululenvriler can impact investors' perceptions of IPO firm quality (Beatty & Ritter; Carter et al.. 1998b; Carter & Manaster, 1990) . We coded this variable from Jay Ritter's personal website at the University of Florida (where all underwriter reputation rankings are available) and it is based on the methodology employed by Carter and Manaster and Carter, Dark, and Singh. We also controlled for founder efrects because founders may affect the survival and performance of new ventures (Cerlo, Covin. et aI.. 2001; Nelson. 20(3) . We llsed a dummy variable to opermiollalize founder on the board (I =founder, 0 =nonfoullder) (e.g.. Arthurs et al.. 20(9) . Number of risk factors are included because higher risk may increase underpricing and could influence performance. Certo, Covin. et al. (200 [. p. 650) write that "risk factors associated with a finn can affect both perfommnce expectations and realized performance." Therefore. a 11rm's risk position was operation alized as the number of risk factors as reported in the prospeclUs (Beatty & Zajac; Welbourne & Andrews. 1996) .
Equity raised or the percentage of equity offered in the IPO was measured as the ratio of total shares offered to total shares outstanding (l\1udambi & Zimmerman. 2005) . It is important to control for this variable since the amount of capital raised at IPO might be a function of the percentage of equity the company t10ats at IPO (Zimmerman. 2(08) . Serial .!iJ/lilder counted the number of other finns founded by TMT members as listed in the prospectus. IPO firms that had one or more top managers with experience in founding other companies were coded "I," while firms without such experience were coded "0:' Typically. venture capitalists have a very positive outlook toward previolls experience in founding other finllS (Wright. Robbie. & Ennew. 1997) .
A high volume of IPO activity usually characterizes hot markets (Ibbotson & Jaffe. 1975 ). During such a period. the number of firms that undergo an IPO and the average value of the [POs brought to market is considerably higher than during a normal period (DeCarolis & Deeds. J999; Ritter, 1989) . Our data showed that 2004, 2005, 2006. and 2007 all had the characteristics of a hot market. IPOs during the hot market years were coded "I." while all others were coded "0." Generated slack generally denotes available resources for developing strategy options for future l1exibility and was measured as sales per employee (Chakravarthy. 1986). More specifically, this ratio refers to the ability to attain surplus revenue from employees. and therefore the higher the ratio, the higher the resources available for future flexibility (Greenley & Oktemgil, 1998) . fm'ested slack was measured using R&D by sales ratio (Chakravarthy) and generally represents deployed resources, which could reduce the opportunity to develop strategy options for future flexibility. We controlled for both of these slack measures given that some previous research has shown that excellent firms are better at managing their slack resources (Chakravarthv) and that some slack studies found ~ ~ J a positive relationship between slack and performance (e.g .. Bromiley. J991; Miller & Leiblein. 1996) . We controlled for prior sales. If a J1rm has sales, then investors consider a firm's revenue track record before the IPO (Zimmerman, 2(08) . Prior sales were measured using the towl revenue as reported in the prospectus in each firm's income statement. This measure could also impact the amount of slack a firm has for a particular year given that the budgeting process will depend. in pan. on prior sales. We also controlled for the possible effects of venture-capital backing (Ve-backing) (e.g. • Certo. Daily. et al.. 2001 : Megginson & Weiss. 1991 . This variable has shown to influence the ability of an IPO finn to raise capital (Brav & Gompers. 2003 : Gulati & Higgins, 2003 Megginson & Weiss) . increase chances of survival (Khurshed, 2000) . and influence the amount of slack resources a tinn has (Macmillan. Kulow. & Khoylian. 1989) . Firms backed by venture capitalists were calculated as a dichotomous measure coded I for VC-backing. 0 if not. Retum Oil (Isseis (ROM was measured in the year prior to IPO (Miehaely & Shaw. 1994) . We controlled for ROA given that profitability is an "obvious determinant" of finns' slack resources (Chakravarthy. 1986). We controlled for jirm si:e given that prior research has shown that larger IPO firms tend to outperform smaller ones in terms of stock appreciation (e.g.. Megginson & Weiss: Mikkelsoll. Partch. &. Shah. 1997) . We used log of empJoyees to control for size (e.g .. Deeds et al.. 1997) . Finally, we <.:O!l!rolled for pril'llfe jii/ill/cillg that IPO firms had received before going public to control for previous success in securing financial capital (c.g .. Gulati & Higgins: Stuart &. Sorenson. 2003) .'
Results
We used partial hierarchical Illultiple regression to examine the hypotheses. Table 2 presents the descriptive statistics and correlation matrix for all variables. Overall, the correlations are low to intermediate. Patent slack is positively cOiTelated with R&D slack. a result that is not surprising because any firm that invests heavily in research would also want to protect any innovations that might be found during the process. Thus. it is logical that as the commitment to R&D increases. so would the number of patents owned by the finn. The number-of-managers slack is negatively correlated with firm size in our dataset and positively correlated to cash slack, suggesting that a control for firm size is important for measuring the effect of managerial slack and tlnancial slack. Patent and R&D slack also were positively correlated to managerial slack. However. because the variance inflation factors (VIF) for these terms are below 3.4. which is well below the VIF of I() that Kenlledy advocates is indicative of "harmful collinearity" (Kennedy, 1992. p. 183) . it is unlikely that this correlatioll will confound the results of any statis tical tests.' We examined the VIF for all models: nOlle were close to the coml11only accepted threshold of 10 (Cryer & Miller. 1991 : Neter. Wasserman. & Kutner, 1985 . The VIF values ruled out the possibility that multicollinearity and the instability of band beta were a serious problem. Table 3 displays the results for the regressions. The base model had five significant results: serial founder, prior sales. VC backing. firm size. and private financing. Prior sales. finn size. and private financing all had a positive relationship with IPO value. while serial founder and VC backing had a negative one. Model 2 shows that the additional variables contribute significantly to our understanding of the amount of capital raised through 11'0 beyond the control variables (change in R' '" 0.335). Cash reserves was positively and significantly related to the size of the IPO valuation while working capital was negatively and significalllly related (0 IPO valuation. thus providing strong support for hypotheses I a and lb. -P < 0, 10: '* p < OJ}S: p < (lUI: +N f1 <: OJ}(H Hypotheses 2a and 2b predicted a nonlinear !inverted U-shaped and U-shapcd, res pectively) relationship between innovational slack and IPQ value, The coefficient for the R&D-slack squared term is negative and significant, providing support for hypothesis 2a, and the coefficient for the patent-slack squared term interestingly is positive and signifi cant, which is opposite to what we expected. The linear terms for both innovational slack variables were significanl. Hypothesis 3a and 3b predicted all invcJ1ed U-shaped relationship between managerial slack and IPQ value. The results show that contrary to OUl' expectations, the coefficient for insider slack squared term is positive and significant. The squared term coefficient of industry-expericncc slack was negative but not significant. The number of insiders slack linear term was negative and significant while the linear term for experience slack was not significant.
Further, we performed additional analyses to evaluate whether the results indicate robust relationships in the data. First, we reran the same regression equations used to test the hypotheses with 25'10 of the sample randomly deleted from the data set. The results were identical to the ones presented in our model utilizing 100% of the data except for hypothesis 2 that lost some significance (from p < 0.001 to p < 0,0]). Second, 50% of the sample were randomly deleted from our data set. This time, the model retained support for all hypotheses except hypothesis 2 that lost all support. Overall then, it is reasonable to suggest that our findings seem robust and stable. Further, our results show that they are not spurious but instead they reveal a distinct structure within the data that is supportive of our hypotheses.
Discussion
We found financial slack, specifically cash reserves, to be positively and significantly related to the capital raised through an IPO. The results suggest that financial slack may provide a signal to investors about the quality of the finn and its future performance potential. A strong financial position supports future growth because. as Penrose (1959) explained. a firm's future strategies are mainly determined by its current portfolio of resources. particularly by its financial resources. Additionally, firms with financial slack can be sending a signal about their ability to respond to shifting environmental demands (Cheng & Kesner, 1997) . Bromiley (1991) reasoned that financial slack provides firms with the ability to smooth over short-term disturbances in the environment and, thus, build and maintain competitive advantage. These jindings arc also interesting given the com monly held view that financial slack could imply the existence of excess resources that are not being used for productive purposes (Mishina et al.. 2004) and that it could lead to inefticiency and nonoptirnizing behavior (Bourgeois, 198 I; Simon. 1957) . However. we sec it as a matter of context, where potential investors seem to perceive financial slack as a positive-given the high demands of undertaking an IPO-not a negative. Therefore, ill the case of high-tech firms that arc planning to undertake an IPO, a solid financial position seems extremely important to reduce the unccnainty surrounding the firm in the eyes of investors.
On the other ham!. as predicted. working capital slack was negatively related to IPO value. This result reveals that investors disapprove of tlrms with high levels of working capital slack. Such a signal can indicate that these young, untested firms have too many accounts receivables. carry a lot of inventory and, therefore, are inefficient and/oI' risky. Not being able to collect on receivables could, arguably, be expected from many of these young tlrrns. Small or new finns are seen as easy targets for tardy payers. Many of these high-tech industries can be characterized as being difficult to pioneer in. thus making it 1110re difficult to sell the product once it is developed, and being high-tech. product complexity may require large numbers of expensive parts, thus increasing inventory costs and risk. Additionally. medical equipment or biotech industries are both industries that may have very high minimum-efficient scale, therefore making it difficult for these young companies that are trying to introduce new products into such an industry. Regardless of all these difficulties. slack in working capital denotes inefficiency and an increased risk of failure.
Innovational slack was found to be significantly related to 11'0 value. R&D slack was found to have a negative coeftkient tinvcrted-U shaped), while, contrary to expectations, patent slack was found to have a positive coefficient relationship with 11'0 value (U-shaped). The finding for R&D slack is interesting insofar as it suggests that. up to a certain point, investors perceive R&D slack positively. For high-tech firms that want to have an IPQ, it seems safe to argue that above-average industry investments are expected. Investors want to see these firms invesling more than their peers, which might signal high levels of commitment to innovation. Firms that arc not committed, or might have CEOs that are not committed, will be extremely reluctant to have slack in R&D at that stage. Even though R&D expenditures have been linked to an increase in market value (Chauvin & Hirschey. 1993; Doukas & Switzer, 1992 ). it appears that there is an optimal amount. Large R&D investments in IPO firms might signal high risk. For more established companies, above-industry-average investments in R&D might be expected. but in the case of !PO firms-given the uncertainty surrounding R&D investments and the useful ness of the outcomes-such investments may be a red flag and indicate that innovations are still 1:11' from being ready for cOlllmercialization. In the case of patent slack. we found that investors prefer new firms to have either low amounts or high amounts of patent slack. retlccting preference for either lIsing trade secrets or building patent fences. Thus. the key selling points for IPO firms is their innovation and their management. and innovation is best protected through trade secrets or by embracing the costs of patent defense.
We found that managerial slack is signillcantly related to IPO valuations. However. contrary to our prediction, the number of managers slack squared terlll was positively and significantly associated (V-shaped) with raising funds through an IPO. It appears that investors either do not like slack (a lean TMT is better) or they like a large team with spare capacity. What is surprising, but perhaps should not be given Penrose's (1959) arguments, is the tinal part of that curvc. where investors value firms with high levels of managerial slack. We argued that the costs associated with having that many managers would affect an organization negatively. Investors though seem to feel that high levels of managerial slack might be an indication of managerial commitment to growth where these firms are accumulating the resources needed for such plans. Investors seem to be cautious of firms that have moderate levels of managerial slack and the potential for inefficiency. Finns that fall in the middle here might signal a lack of purpose since such moderate levels of managerial slack might not be sufficient for undertaking lame growth initiatives, such as Experience slack was 11m significant. Onc possible conclusion here could be that investors do not perceive excess managerial experience of TMT members at the time of the IPO as important as we theorized they would. Because industry-speeifk managerial experience can be obtained in the labor market and deployed in tlrms in the same industry. its value added may be low. and investors may view a certain level of experience as sufficient to undertake any challenge they face. Another possible conclusion might have had to do with the way we measured expeIience slack. This we discuss further in the limitations and future directions section.
Implications
The study makes a !lumber of contributions to the literature. It develops a causal logic for the impact of differcm forms of slack resources on IPO firm success. A.lso. we have introduced the concepts of innovational and managerial slack that capture an aspect of slack resources that has not been examined before, thereby extending our know!edge of organizational slack by moving beyond the traditional emphasis on financial slack. By examining all three (financial. innovation, and managerial), this work provides a more complete understanding of the effects of slack resources. George (2005) called for research to study slack in different contexts to help classify behavioral differences between these firms. He believed that this would lead to a refinement of the logic of the slack-performance relationship. By focusing on IPO firms. this research helps to address this call. We argue, and our results appear to indicate, that resources can act as signals of quality, thus extending signaling theory in the IPO literature.
Previous IPO-signaling research focused primarily on the extemal associations of a finn (e.g., underwriter reputation or VC backing) or fi11l1-specific characteristics (e.g., firm size or TMT composition). Megginson and Weiss ( 1991 ) found that because VC backing provides financial resources and expertise to a firm, it signals quality to investors.
Financial and innovational slack also provide valuable signals. Higgins and Gulati (1006) showed that TMT composition can signal legitimacy in tenns of the ability of the TMT to fulfill critical roles, access resources. and attract endorsements from prestigious partners. As this work shows, also having the right numbers of managers also provides a signal for investors. Moderate levels. however. seem to send a negative signal to investors. possibly suggesting inefficiency or even window dressing. And high levels of slack seem to be perceived by investors as a sign that these firms have large growth aspirations possibly through acquisitions.
Limitations and Future Directions
Because this study included a range of firms from different industries, the results can reasonably be generalized to different time peIiods and other industries. But there is the possibility that the unique characteristics of high-tech firms influenced the results. A focus on less technology-intensive IPO firms, or firms in more stable industries. might reveal additional insights into the way organizational slack influences IPO valu ations. Also, this study used secondary data: we relied on observable indicators. such as the number of managerial positions, to measure managerial-slack constructs that involve tacit, experiential knowledge. An in-depth study into the process mechanisms could explain the links between managerial slack and IPO value, and alternative methodologies, such as surveys, experiments, and simulations, may provide additional insights.
For future research, other forms of financial. innovational. and managerial slack deserve to be examined. For example. tapping into managerial experience through the number of positions is a logical approach, with precedent (e.g., Kor. 2(03) . Neverthe less, the way we measured this variable might have affected the results. Researchers still find numerous problems with identifying and quantifying specialized knowledge. For instance. it often only becomes obvious which knowledge was important for success long after the firm was established and has gone public. For example, with Apple, it appears that it was Steve Jobs's understanding of the humanization of technology that was important, rather thun any specific technical knowledge. Also, given that we are dealing with slack resonrces. that means that we have to be able to quantify the knowl edge either in absolute terms or relative to others in the field. Making that assessment requires being an expert in, or having access to someone who is an expert in, each manager's specialized knowledge. We see here a number of directions for future research. Some scholars might tinc! it rewarding to investigate better ways of eapturing this knowledge. Also. future research may address the question of if the value of past IPO experience is critical because entrepreneurial tlrms may avoid startup mistakes by hiring managers with this experience (Dyke. Fischer. & Reuber, 1992) . Or managers' experience in related industries perhaps could be valuable to young lirllls, as could their experience on the boards of other startups.
Concluding Remarks
Much discussion has taken place in the management literature regarding the question of whether slack resources are beneficial or detrimental to the success of a finn (e.g" Bourgeois, 198 J; Cheng & Kesner, 1997; Cyert & March, I 963!l 992; Singh. 1986 ). Our work aimed to demonstrate the importance of slack resources in a different context. In short. we would like to reiterate that recognizing the effect of slack resources on IPO finn valuation is not only theoretically important but also practically significant. Our flndings show that financial, managerial, und innovational slack provides signals to investors about the quality of the firlll and its future performance potential.
